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Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States
and United States v. Monsanto: The "War
on Drugs" Gets a New Recruit
I.

INTRODUCTION

As America entered the eighties, few people denied that the escalation in drug trafficking and drug-related crime posed one of the
most pressing problems facing our nation.' Indeed, in the 1988
presidential election, the issue attained paramount importance in
both the Republican and Democratic campaign platforms. President Bush labeled the drug problem public enemy number one; 2
accordingly, he established a separate agency to head up the fight,
appointed William Bennett as "drug czar,"' 3 and outlined a 7.9 billion dollar strategy.4
President Bush's official commitment to the war on drugs was
tested in the first year of his administration by the December 1989
crisis involving Panamanian President, General Manuel Antonio
1. By 1989, a Gallup Poll indicated that the American public viewed illegal drugs as
the most important problem facing the country. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1990, at A9, col. 5.
Another poll revealed that 85% of Americans would support penalties such as the temporary suspension of a driver's license, seizure of cars used to buy or carry drugs, and
community service sentences against even casual users of illegal drugs. Get Tough on
Users, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 1989, at 18, 23. Thirty-four percent of the American public
would support a one percent surtax to personal income taxes to raise money for the fight
against illegal drugs, and 65% would support a one percent surtax to corporate income
taxes. Id
2. Inaugural Address to the Nation, 135 CONG. REc. S68-69 (daily ed. Jan. 20,
1989). In his address, President Bush stated:
There are few clear areas in which we as a society must rise up united and
express our intolerance. The most obvious now is drugs. And when that first
cocaine was smuggled in on a ship, it may as well have been a deadly bacteria,
so much has it hurt the body, the soul of our country. And there is much to be
done and to be said. But take my word for it: This scourge will stop.
Id. at S69.
3. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 1002, 102 Stat. 4181, 418182 (1988) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1501 (1988)). The Act establishes the "Office of National Drug Control Policy," headed by a Director of National Drug Control Policy. 21
U.S.C. § 1501(a)-(b)(1) (1988). The Office must prepare and submit a National Drug
Control Strategy to include, inter alia, "comprehensive, research-based, long-range goals
for reducing drug abuse in the United States." Id. § 1504(a)(2)(A).
4. Now It's Bush's War, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 1989, at 22. President Bush stated
that illegal drugs were "the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today." Id. Gallup
polls revealed that Americans plainly wanted decisive action in the war on drugs and
hungered for quick results, probably the biggest political problem facing both President
Bush and William Bennett. Id.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 22

Noriega. In response to Noriega's declaration of war against the
United States, President Bush authorized "Operation Just Cause,"
at the time the largest United States military airlift since Vietnam.This operation sent the United States military into Panama to secure the surrender of General Noriega, the person believed to be
responsible for massive shipments of illegal drugs into the United
States.6 Reactions in the United States to Noriega's capture and
subsequent imprisonment revealed that the public supported the
President's use of strong-arm tactics in the war against drugs.7
The public mandate for a frontal assault on the drug problem
had been building for a decade. In 1980, Congress resolved to
strengthen existing anti-drug legislation 8 because law enforcement
agencies were not using these statutes aggressively to attack the
growing drug menace. 9 Congress's strategy to this end was to remove the profit incentive in drug trafficking.10 The result of this
strategy was the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (Forfeiture
Act)."
5. The Invasion of Panama, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1, 1990, at 12, 14.
6. Among the stated goals of the United States military forces was to bring Noriega
to justice in the United States, where he had been indicted in May 1988 for drug-trafficking. Id at 14-19. Noriega allegedly permitted Colombia's Medellin cartel to use Panama
as a transshipment point for cocaine headed for the United States. Id. at 15.
7. A Gallup Poll indicated that 80% of Americans believed that the United States
was justified in sending military forces to invade Panama and overthrow Noriega. The
PanamaInvasion: A Newsweek Poll, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1, 1990, at 14, 22.
8. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat.
922, 943 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988); Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236,
1265-66 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988)).
9. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3182, 3374 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]
("[one reason] for the failure of forfeiture statutes - which in 1970 were proclaimed to
be the ideal weapon for breaking the backs of sophisticated narcotics operations - w[as]
that Federal law enforcement agencies had not aggressively pursued forfeiture"). Without vigorous enforcement by the Justice Department, the statutes posed no real threat to
criminals with the economic resources to absorb the routine penalties imposed. Id. In a
ten year period beginning in 1970, when the forfeiture provisions were first implemented,
only 98 cases (involving approximately two million dollars in actually or potentially forfeitable assets) returned indictments seeking forfeitures. United States v. Nichols, 841
F.2d 1485, 1487 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSET FORFEITURE-A SELDOM USED TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING at ii (1981)
[hereinafter ASSET FORFEITURE]). Yet trade in illegal drugs "generated an estimated
sixty billion dollars annually." Id. at 1488.
10. Cloud, ForfeitingDefense Attorneys' Fee" Applying an InstitutionalRole Theory
to Define Individual ConstitutionalRights, 1987 WiS. L. REV. 1, 16 (1987) (Congress
predicted that if the forfeiture provision was implemented correctly, "criminals w[ould]
lose the economic benefits of their illicit behavior and eventually organized crime, deprived of its raison d'etre, should simply wither away").
11. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040 (1984)
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The Forfeiture Act is designed to undercut the enormous power
wielded by organized crime and drug lords by striking at the heart
of these enterprises: their economic base.12 The Forfeiture Act
seeks to accomplish this goal by expanding the criminal forfeiture
provisions of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization
13
Act (RICO)
and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute
14
(CCE).
More recently, the judicial branch of the government has joined
the fray, strengthening the arsenal available to law enforcement
agencies in conducting the war on drugs. In Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States'5 and United States v. Monsanto,'6 the
Supreme Court considered whether the government could use the
Forfeiture Act to freeze the assets of a defendant charged under
RICO or CCE, even when such a freeze prevented the defendant
from retaining the defense counsel of his choice. Despite a long
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988)). By passing
the Act, Congress hoped to eliminate the law enforcement community's virtual failure to
use the forfeiture provisions of the previous Act. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 191.
The all-inclusive language of the new Act was intended to convey Congress' hope that the
law enforcement agencies would vigorously pursue the forfeiture of an accused's assets
under this title. Id. The legislative history evinces the Congressional motive behind the
Act:
Today, few in the Congress or the law enforcement community fail to recognize that the traditional sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to
deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs which... is
plaguing the country. Clearly, if law enforcement efforts to combat racketeering and drug trafficking are to be successful, they must include an attack on the
economic aspects of these crimes. Forfeiture is the mechanism through which
such an attack may be made.
Id.
12. See S. REP. No. 224, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1983) ("[profit is the motivation
for this criminal activity, and it is through economic power that it is sustained and
grows").
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). The Forfeiture Act affected RICO in several
ways. The forfeiture provision of RICO, section 1963(a), was amended to provide for the
forfeiture of both direct and derivative proceeds obtained from racketeering activities.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 199. Section 1963(b), as amended, emphasizes that
"either real property or tangible or intangible personal property" is subject to forfeiture.
Id. at 200. The Forfeiture Act changed section 1963(e) to allow the courts "to enter
restraining orders to preserve the availability of forfeitable assets until the conclusion of
trial." Id. at 202. The Forfeiture Act also added a new procedure, section 1963(m),
whereby interested "third part[ies can assert] a legal interest in the property ordered
forfeited [by] petition[ing] the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of [their]
alleged interest[s]." Id. at 208.
14. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). The Forfeiture Act amended CCE to make it "in nearly
all respects, identical to the [amended] RICO criminal forfeiture statute." SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 209.
15. 109 S.Ct. 2646 (1989).
16. 109 S.Ct. 2657 (1989).
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line of cases recognizing the sixth amendment right to counsel of
choice, 17 the Supreme Court broke new ground and announced
that the government's interest in obtaining full recovery of potentially forfeitable assets supersedes that right.' 8
This Note traces the legislative development of the 1984 Forfeiture Act and analyzes subsequent case law interpreting the Act.
Concurrently, the Note highlights the inevitable clash between the
Act's forfeiture provisions and a defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel. Next, the Note provides an in-depth analysis of
the lower court decisions in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States and United States v. Monsanto, as well as the
Supreme Court's holdings in those cases. Finally, the Note criticizes the Court's decision to confront the sixth amendment issue,
and its consequent dilution of the defendant's right to counsel
under the sixth amendment.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The ForfeitureAct

In 1970, Congress enacted the criminal forfeiture provisions of
RICO 9 and CCE.2° These provisions reflect eighteenth century
English law, which recognized forfeiture consequent to attainder.2 '
Congress enacted these statutes to give prosecutors "a powerful
weapon in the fight against drug trafficking and racketeering. "22 If
17. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) ("[t]he right to select
and be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (the assistance of counsel is
provided to ensure that every criminal defendant receives a fair trial); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (part of the sixth amendment's guarantee is the protection of a
defendant's opportunity to obtain counsel of choice). The Supreme Court has also stated,
however, that "the essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective
advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers." Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159.
18. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. at 2651-56.
19. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922,
941-48 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
20. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265-66 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848
(1988).
21. See Brickey, ForfeitureofAttorneys'Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493 n. 1 (1986) ("[u]pon a defendant's
conviction for treason or a felony, all his goods and chattels were forfeited absolutely")
(citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *381, *385). The criminal forfeiture provisions under RICO and CCE are in personam forfeitures in "that the court can acquire
power or jurisdiction over the defendant himself as opposed to jurisdiction over his property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990).
22. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 194.
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prosecutors employed the forfeiture provisions of RICO and
CCE 23 as anticipated, the government could "separate convicted
criminals from the[ir] economic power bases" and score a significant gain against drug traffickers.24
Much to Congress's dismay, the Department of Justice did not
implement these statutes as expected, but essentially ignored their
potential for more than a decade. 25 A 1981 General Accounting
Office report revealed that the federal government was failing to
take the profit incentive out of drug trafficking crimes.26 The report attributed the failure to two major causes: (1) the lack of aggressive pursuit of forfeiture of all drug-related property, and (2)
the presence of "limitations and ambiguities" in the forfeiture statute. 27 As a result, this study concluded, the Justice Department
was not maximizing the potential of forfeiture as a law enforcement weapon. 281
Based on this report and its own recognition of the statute's limitations, 29 Congress passed the Forfeiture Act 30 in 1984. The most
23. RICO is aimed at "the conduct, acquisition, and control of enterprises through
patterns of racketeering activity"; CCE addresses "the operation of groups involved in
patterns of serious drug offenses." Id. at 193.
24. Brickey, supra note 21, at 495.
25. Blakey, Forfeiture of Legal Fees: Who Stands to Lose?, 36 EMORY L.J. 781, 787
(1987). Congress made several incorrect assumptions in drafting the forfeiture provision,
which attributed to the mechanism's initial failure. Congress assumed: "that the Department of Justice was committed to [a forfeiture] program"; that it would implement the
provision "with discretion, but vigorously"; "that the federal judiciary would ... implement [the legislation] with care and discretion"; and that "the practicing bar ... would
[approach the forfeiture provision with] intelligence and sympathy for the problem." Id.
As a result of these assumptions, the legislature drafted the provision broadly, a decision
that quickly backfired. Id. Far from giving the statute "an imaginative or a vigorous
implementation... [t]he federal judiciary came to the statutes as a country parson reading the first chapter of Genesis-with a dry and hostile literalism." Id. at 788.
26. H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1984) [hereinafter HOUSE
REPORT]. This report confirmed Congress's suspicions that the drug statutes were having no real impact. Drug traffickers continued to reap enormous profits and regarded
financial penalties for drug dealing as just a "cost of doing business." Id.; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 191.
27. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 191.
28. Id.
29. Congress delineated four major shortcomings to the 1970 forfeiture statute. Id. at
194-97. First, "the scope of property subject to forfeiture . . . [was] too limited . . .
[because RICO] exempt[ed] racketeering proceeds from [the] forfeiture scheme." Id. at
194-95. Second, both the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions "[did] not adequately
address the serious problem of a defendant's pretrial disposition of his assets [to third
parties]." Id. at 196. "[B]y removing, transferring, or concealing their assets prior to
conviction," defendants could avoid forfeiture. Id. at 195. The lack of a standard for
issuing restraining orders compounded this problem and made very real the threat of
dissipated assets. Id. at 195-96. Third, Congress recognized that "the need to pursue
virtually all drug-related property through civil proceedings" resulted in "a backlog of
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significant provisions of the Forfeiture Act: (1) authorize forfeiture of "proceeds" that accrue to an enterprise or association
through racketeering activity, a" (2) void preconviction transfers of
assets in criminal forfeiture cases unless a bona fide purchaser escivil forfeiture cases." Id. at 196-97. Finally, because the backlog of cases put a tremendous strain on law enforcement agency budgets, the government's "take" was apt to be
less than its incurred expenses, largely due to deterioration, maintenance, and storage
costs of the property subject to forfeiture. Id. at 197.
30. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040 (1984)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988)). The Act
amended and added various forfeiture provisions for RICO and CCE offenses. In relevant part, the Forfeiture Act amends CCE by adding:
SEC. 413. (a) Any person convicted of a violation of this title or title III ...
shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any State law(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used.... to commit,
or to facilitate the commission of such violation ....
The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order.., that the person
forfeit to the United States all property described in this subsection.
(c) All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in
the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to the forfeiture
under this section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture
....
unless the transferee establishes in a hearing ... that he is a bona fide
purchaser for value of such property who at the time of the purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture ....
(f)(1) Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or injunction . .. to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) . . . (A) upon the filing of an indictment or information... for which criminal
forfeiture may be ordered... and alleging that the property ...
in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture ... ; or

(B)

would,

prior to the filing of such an indictment or information, if, after notice
...and.opportunity for a hearing, the court determines that (i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail
on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will
result in the property being.., made unavailable for forfeiture; and
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of property.., outweighs the
hardship on any party against whom the order is to be entered

Id. at 2044-46 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 853(a),(c),(e)(1) (1988)).
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (a)(1) (1988). Previously,
courts held that racketeering proceeds did not fall under the RICO forfeiture net. See
SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 199. As amended, the Forfeiture Act's scope has been
enlarged to include property "constitute[d], or... derived from, proceeds the defendant
obtained through the racketeering activity .... " i.e., "proceeds accruing to an enterprise
or association involved in a RICO violation." Id. Congress chose to use the term "proceeds" in order "to alleviate the unreasonable burden on the government of proving net
profits." Id.
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tablishes a valid claim,32 and (3) authorize the issuance of a protective order to preserve the availability of property either upon
indictment, or before indictment, if the government shows prob33
able cause that the property will be forfeited upon conviction.
Neither the original forfeiture provision nor the amending statute expressly mentions attorneys' fees. 34 Before the 1984 amendment was passed, several courts interpreted the original forfeiture
provision to apply to assets that a defendant intended to use to pay
his attorney. 35 After the Act was amended in 1984, however,
many members of the legal community contended that Congress
did not intend the forfeiture provision to reach assets transferred to
an attorney for legitimate legal services, even if those assets were
potentially forfeitable. 36 Certain courts, however, refused to recognize an exception for attorneys' fees and decided the forfeiture issue based on whether the attorney was a "bona fide purchaser" 37
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988). The addition of a "relation back" clause enabled the government to close one potential loophole of the statute
as it previously stood. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 200. Prior to the relation back
provision, "a defendant could attempt to avoid criminal forfeiture by transferring his
property to another prior to conviction." Id. The government's interest in the property
now vests at the time of the act giving rise to the forfeiture "and is not necessarily extinguished simply because the defendant subsequently transfers his interest to another." Id.
33. In this context, probable cause refers to the statutory language that a court will
not permit preindictment forfeiture unless "there is substantial probability that the
United States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture." 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(B)(i) (1988);
21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B)(i) (1988).
These changes remove the ambiguities of the old forfeiture provisions and give federal
law enforcement agencies license to pursue aggressively the forfeiture of a defendant's
assets, both before and after conviction. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 191-93.
34. The legislative history of the Act is silent regarding legal fees. Hearings and debates contain only oblique references to the sixth amendment right to counsel problem.
"Nothing in this section is intended to interfere with a person's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. The Committee, therefore, does not resolve the conflict in District Court
opinions on the use of restraining orders that impinge on a person's right to retain counsel in a criminal case." See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 19 n. 1.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1984) (the court
recognized the sixth amendment's protection of the right to retain counsel of one's
choice, but because the district court appointed the same attorney sought by the defendant, and because the defendant had not shown that his choice was restricted, the defendant was not denied counsel of choice); United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D.
Cal. 1979) (the court specifically stated that the right to counsel does not mean the right
to counsel of choice, but that the alternative of appointed counsel would adequately protect the defendant's sixth amendment rights).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(the court distinguished between property a defendant intended to transfer to an attorney
and property already transferred to an attorney; the latter was excluded by the court
from the forfeiture provision's reach).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988). A bona fide purchaser
is "one who has purchased property for value without any notice of any defects in the
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with an interest in the defendant's assets that was superior to the
government's interest. Although several courts interpreted the
bona fide purchaser provision broadly to exempt legal fees from the
government's grasp, other courts construed the provision narrowly
and required forfeiture of assets that were used or intended to be
used to pay attorneys' fees.3" Initially, courts skirted the issue of
the Forfeiture Act's impact on a defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel.39
B.

Case Law Development

United States v. Rogers' was the first case to interpret the forfeiture provisions of the Act. In Rogers, a grand jury returned a
thirty-count indictment, which included a racketeering charge,
against the named defendants. 41 Contemporaneously with the filing of the indictment, the government sought a restraining order to
prohibit the disposition of allegedly forfeitable property.42 Counsel
for the defendants made a conditional appearance to contest the
government's position and moved to exclude legal fees from forfeiture.4 3 The attorneys argued that the Forfeiture Act did "not protitle of the seller, or one who pays valuable consideration, has no notice of outstanding
rights of others, and acts in good faith." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 177 (6th ed. 1990).
38. Compare United State v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. 1988) ("the defense
attorney's necessary knowledge of the charges against his client cannot defeat his interest
in receiving payment out of the defendant's forfeited assets for legitimate legal services"),
rev'd, 877 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying the Supreme Court's decision in Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2646 (1989)); United States v. Bassett,
632 F. Supp. 1308, 1315-16 (D. Md. 1986) ("the attorney representing a client under
indictment for a RICO violation or a [CCE] drug-related offense is ... certainly not...
just a bogus conduit for [his client's] money when providing bona fide legal services")
(emphasis in original); and United States v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 455-56
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("it is evident that bona fide attorneys' fees paid to defense counsel who
serve the defendants' needs within our adversary system [are] not intended to be forfeitable by Congress," since such fees are neither "part of an artifice or sham to avoid forfeiture") with United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1493-94 (10th Cir. 1988) (the bona
fide purchaser exception "imposes the same conditions on attorneys as it does on any
other third party who seeks to defeat a forfeiture claim," requiring forfeiture on "the
basis of the knowledge of the possibility of forfeiture, not on the basis of whether the
transaction was fraudulent").
39. The sixth amendment guarantees that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. For an analysis of the origin and importance of the sixth amendment right to
counsel of choice, see Winick, Forfeitureof Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the
Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 765, 784-817 (1989).
40. 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1334 (D. Colo. 1985).
41. Id.at 1334.
42. Id.
43. Id.

1990]

War on Drugs

vide for the forfeiture of assets transferred by defendants to their
attorneys for legitimate services performed."' Alternatively, they
contended that the new forfeiture provisions unconstitutionally violated fifth amendment due process, were "ex post facto laws as
applied to these defendants," and denied the defendants of their
sixth amendment right to counsel.45
In ruling on the motion, the court interpreted the bona fide purchaser exception as evincing Congress's intent to treat assets in the
hands of third parties differently from assets remaining in the defendant's possession.46 The court then looked to the Forfeiture
Act's legislative history to determine which of a defendant's previously transferred assets were forfeitable.47 Although the section
dealing with transfers of a defendant's property included sham or
fraudulent transactions, the court concluded that the section did
not apply to legitimate transactions. 48 Therefore, the court held
that a criminal defendant's payments to his attorney for legitimate
legal services are not subject to forfeiture, because such transactions are neither a "sham" nor "fraudulent."49
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York confronted the Rogers issue in United States v. Badalamenti5 and United States v. Ianniello.' In Badalamenti, the government sought to subpoena records that indicated the amount of
fees already paid by the defendant to his attorney, with the intent
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1347.
47. Id.
48. Id. "The statute is not designed to set aside legitimate transfers for value ....
The attorney who receives funds for bona fide services rendered engages in neither a
fraud nor a sham." Id. "Like the grocer compensated for the food he sells the defendant
or the doctor paid a fee for healing the defendant's children, the lawyer is entitled to
compensation for his services actually and legitimately rendered." Id. at 1348.
49. Id. The court noted that the amendments made to CCE by the Forfeiture Act
mirror the Forfeiture Act's amendments to RICO. Id.; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text. Thus, the court relied on House Judiciary Committee comments regarding
the in personam forfeiture provision of CCE to interpret the RICO forfeiture provision:
"Nothing in this section [dealing with in personam forfeiture] is intended to interfere
with a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Id. (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 26, at 19 n.1). But see United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914-17 (3d Cir. 1981)
(circumstances surrounding the transfer of defendant's airplane to his attorney suggested
the existence of a sham for which a restraining order or forfeiture would be appropriate)
(interpreting the criminal forfeiture provision of 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2)(B) (1976), which
requires the forfeiture of the profits from a continuing criminal enterprise and "any of
[the defendant's] interest in, claim against, or property or contractual rights... affording
a source of influence over, such enterprise").
50. 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
51. 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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of seeking forfeiture of those fees.5 2 The defendant moved to quash
the subpoena, arguing that it violated his right to counsel under the
sixth amendment."3 The district court adopted the Rogers approach, construing the Forfeiture Act narrowly because a broad
interpretation, in the court's view, would violate the sixth amendment right to counsel. 54 Judge Leval remarked that, read literally,
the Forfeiture Act seems to embrace legal fees." But, the judge
reasoned, such a reading most likely would violate the sixth
56
amendment and Congress could not have intended this result.
Therefore, the court held that forfeiture did not apply to money
already paid by the defendant to his attorney in exchange for bona
fide legal services."
Similarly, the defendant in Ianniello sought an order declaring
attorneys' fees exempt from RICO forfeiture.58 Defense counsel
52. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 195. The government sought the documents as
evidence of the defendant's crimes; namely, that the defendant derived "substantial income" from a "continuing criminal enterprise" and racketeering. Id. The government
had "reason to believe that [the attorney's fee was] in the [range] of $500,000, and that
the evidence of [the defendant's] possession of such a sum to pay [for an] attorney [wa]s
proof of ... revenues from narcotics trafficking." Id The government sought forfeiture
of those funds from the attorney under both the RICO and CCE provisions. Id. at 19596.
53. Id. at 195.
54. Id. at 197-98.
55. Id at 198.
56. Id.
57. Id The court distinguished this case from United States v.. Payden, 605 F. Supp.
839 (S.D.N.Y.),.rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985). The Payden case
involved the defendant's inability to retain a lawyer when "[his] funds ... have been
sequestered in anticipation of eventual forfeiture." Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197
(citing Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849 n. 14 (emphasis added)). The attorney for the defendant in Payden was served a subpoena duces tecum to "appear before the Grand Jury and
disclose certain information regarding his fee arrangement with [the defendant]."
Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 843. The court held that even if a lawyer is forced to withdraw
from the case due to his inability to represent his client adequately under the circumstances or because he is discouraged due to the "ever-present threat that his... fees will
eventually be forfeited," the defendant's sixth amendment rights are not compromised.
Id at 853. The right to effective assistance of counsel, the court stated, does not translate
into "the absolute right to counsel of one's choice." Id. at 852. Thus, "merely requiring
a defendant's lawyer to testify does not.., operate to deprive the accused of a fair trial."
Id at 851 (quoting United States v. Freeman, 519 F.2d 67, 68 (9th Cir. 1975)).
In contrast, the Badalamenti court confronted the "problem of the'subsequent forfeiture of the fee paid to an attorney." Badalamenti, 614 F.Supp. at 197. The court reasoned that the problem was not a constitutional one, but instead created a situation in
which a wealthy defendant, who does not qualify for appointed counsel, may be unable to
"obtain a lawyer at all if the lawyer will incur forfeiture of his fee upon the client's
conviction." Id. at 197-98 (emphasis in original).
58. United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Section
1963(1), at issue in this case, allows a third party to "petition the court for a hearing to
adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property." 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l)(2)
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made a conditional appearance, at which he agreed to represent the
defendant on stipulation that the court grant the order. 59 The Ianniello court noted that when deciding among possible interpretations, courts generally are obliged to construe congressional acts as
consistent with the Constitution.w The court further reasoned that
reading the Act to allow forfeiture of attorneys' fees would render
the Act unconstitutional under the sixth amendment.6" Accordingly, the court concluded that Congress could not have intended
such a result and held that attorneys' fees are exempt from RICO
forfeiture.62
United States v. Thier 63 was the only case to depart from the
trend of excluding attorneys' fees from forfeiture. 64 In Thier, the
(1988). The court shall amend the forfeiture order if the petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he "has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, and
such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid ... ; or [that he] is a
bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the property and was at the
time of purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture ....
Id. § 1963(l)(6).
59. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. at 454.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. This court expressly followed Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) and cited Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985) in reaching its decision. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. at 456-57.
The District Court of Maryland also adopted the reasoning behind the Rogers, Badalamenti, and Ianniello decisions in considering the implications of attorney fee forfeitures.
United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1317 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), superseded sub nom. In re Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989). In Bassett, the attorneys
conditioned their continued representation of the client on the court's exemption of their
fees from forfeiture. Id. at 1309. The defendants argued that "forcing their lawyers to
forfeit their fees violates the defendants' constitutional right to counsel of choice; creates
a potential conflict of interest between lawyer and client; undermines the attorney-client
privilege and poses a threat to the adversary system." Id. The government insisted, however, that the defendants only had a "qualified right [to counsel of choice] which must
give way to the public interest if need be.... Forfeiture does not bar defendants from
paying their lawyers with assets earned through legitimate enterprises ....
Congress did
not intend to exempt legal fees from the forfeiture provision." Id. The court concluded
that Congress did not intend to make attorneys' fees subject to forfeiture. Id. at 1317.
The Bassett court arrived at this holding because "[t]o read the statute as including in the
forfeiture provision the fees of attorneys is to violate Sixth Amendment principles." Id.
63. 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987).
64. The district court granted the government's request for an ex parte restraining
order on the strength of the. grand jury indictment and the testimony of the assistant
United States attorney, who presented evidence that the accused was involved in a marijuana smuggling operation. Id. at 1465-66. The district court reached its decision on
statutory grounds, pointing to the absence of any legislative history that would indicate
Congress intended to "exempt assets to pay attorneys fees and living expenses." Id. at
1475.
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district court denied the petitioner's motions to modify a restraining order to permit an exception for attorneys' fees. 65 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that attorneys' fees
were not exempt from forfeiture, but allowed recovery of fees already paid. 66 The appellate court limited its holding to assets remaining in the defendant's possession, stating that the Forfeiture
Act clearly encompassed all property of a convicted defendant.67
In addressing the attorney who wished to pursue the legitimacy of
his claims, the court noted that the Forfeiture Act provides a postconviction hearing for that purpose.68
Thus, prior to the United States Supreme Court's consideration
of the issue, most courts postulated that if legal fees were subject to
forfeiture under the Act, no attorney would be "so foolish, ignorant, beholden, or idealistic" to represent a defendant under a
RICO or CCE charge. 69 Such an interpretation, many courts believed, rendered the forfeiture provision constitutionally vulnerable. As a result, courts often dodged the constitutional issue by
construing the Act to exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture.7 °
Other courts limited the scope of the Act by refusing to sanction
the forfeiture of assets already transferred to attorneys for legitimate legal services.71 Overall, the trend among the courts was to
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1474.
67. Id.
68. Id. Because this was a pretrial hearing, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did
not reach the issue of postconviction attorney fee forfeitures. Id. at 1474. Rather, it
stated that "the defendant's interest in obtaining counsel of choice and the possible adverse effects of a pretrial refusal to exempt defense counsel's fees from forfeiture are...
not factors that mandate a particular result." Id. Instead, the court must balance "the
defendant's interest in having access to funds" against "the government's interest in
preventing the depletion of potentially forfeitable assets" and use its discretion in entering
pretrial restraining orders. Id.
But see United States v. Payden, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985). In that case, the court stated in dicta that "Rogers cannot be
accepted as the law in this district." Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 849 n. 14. Unlike Rogers,
the Payden court did not include attorneys among those who might qualify under the
bona fide purchaser exception. Id. Because an "indictment constitutes notice that the
assets are subject to forfeiture, and a defendant's attorney certainly has actual notice of
what is contained in the indictment," the attorney who accepts funds from his client
under these circumstances has not "entered into an arms length transaction." Id. (citation omitted). In short, the Payden court "ha[d] little sympathy for [attorneys] even
though the results of forfeiture may be harsh." Id.
69. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
70. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. These courts avoided the sixth amendment issue by adhering to the "canon of statutory construction that.., an act should not
be construed to violate the Constitution if a constitutional interpretation is possible."
Winick, supra note 39, at 839.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
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III. DISCUSSION
Against this background, and during the height of the drug war
rhetoric,72 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States71 and United States
v. Monsanto.74 Both cases raised substantially the same issue:
whether funds to pay attorneys' fees are subject to seizure under
the Forfeiture Act. 7' The Court ruled that the broad statutory language unambiguously encompasses attorneys' fees and that the
Forfeiture Act does not conflict with a defendant's constitutional
rights under the fifth and sixth amendments. 76 As a result, the
government now can seize an accused's assets before conviction or
even before indictment 77 and prevent the accused from using the
potentially forfeitable assets toward legal fees. 7a Even if the government does not seize assets prior to conviction, the government
can capture the assets after trial if the defendant is convicted and
the assets are traced to drug-related activity.79
A.

Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States
1. The Facts

In 1983, Christopher Reckmeyer hired the law firm of Caplin &
Drysdale (Caplin) to represent him in an ongoing grand jury investigation by the State of Virginia. 0 By the end of 1984, Reckmeyer
owed Caplin $26,000 in legal fees.8 ' In mid-January, the investigation culminated in a forty-eight-count tax and drug indictment,
which alleged that Reckmeyer operated a massive drug importation ring.82 One of the counts charged Reckmeyer with violating
72. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
73. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
74. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
75. See Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2649; Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2659.
76. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2649.
77. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (1988); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
78. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2667 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2668-69 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Va. 1986), rev'd sub
noma. In re Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd
sub nomr Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
81. Id. Reckmeyer owed exactly $26,444.97 to Caplin for services rendered and costs
incurred from the summer of 1983 through December 1985. Id.
82. In re Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 640 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
Reckmeyer's organization allegedly distributed over 169 tons of marijuana and 10 tons of
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CCE. 3 On the day of the indictment, before he was taken into
custody, Reckmeyer paid Caplin $25,000 in cash for preindictment
services, despite a pretrial restraining order forbidding Reckmeyer
from transferring any potentially forfeitable assets.84
Caplin continued to represent Reckmeyer, who was sentenced to
a prison term after pleading guilty to charges of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise and violating the tax laws.85 Following
Reckmeyer's conviction and sentencing, the district court ordered
forfeiture of virtually all of Reckmeyer's assets.86 Caplin sought a
determination of its property interest in Reckmeyer's forfeited assets. 87 Specifically, Caplin claimed an interest in $170,000 of the
assets for legal services provided to Reckmeyer in addition to the
$25,000 already paid by the client.8 8 Caplin asserted that the assets
which a defendant uses to pay an attorney are exempt from the
Forfeiture Act's broad net; alternatively, Caplin argued that if the
Act does not create an exemption for attorneys fees, it infringes
on the defendant's right to counsel and is, therefore,
unconstitutional. 89
hashish in 50 transactions and laundered the profits, resulting in millions of dollars of
personal income to Reckmeyer. Id.
83. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Supp. V. 1982).
84. Caplin, 837 F.2d at 641. The government obtained an ex parte restraining order
under CCE on January 14, 1985. Id. The order prohibited Reckrneyer from transferring
any of his assets. Id.
85. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1193.
86. Id. Reckmeyer's assets included real estate, gems, and $200,000 in cash. Id. The
forfeiture order specifically included "[a]ll monies and funds restrained by January 14,
1985, restraining order entered in the above styled case, including but not limited to the
approximately $25,000 held in escrow by Bernard S. Bailor [a member of the law firm of
Caplin & Drysdale] and/or his agents." Id.
87. Id. One section of the Forfeiture Act, entitled "Third party interests," provides:
Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in property
which has been ordered forfeited to the United States pursuant to this section
may, within thirty days of the final publication of notice or his receipt of notice
under paragraph (1), whichever is earlier, petition the court for a hearing to
adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property. The hearing shall
be held before the court alone, without a jury.
21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) (1988).
If, after the hearing, the court determines that the petitioner has established
by a preponderance of the evidence that.. . (B) the petitioner is a bona fide
purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the property and was at the
time of purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section; the court shall amend the order of forfeiture
in accordance with its determination.
Id. § 853(n)(6).
88. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1193. The $25,000 was being held in escrow for
Caplin by its agent. See supra note 86.
89. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1193.
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2.

The Procedural History

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia first rejected the government's argument that Caplin lacked
standing to assert its claim. 9° The court then turned to the question of forfeiture of counsel fees and costs. 9 ' The district court
ruled that Caplin had a legitimate property interest in the forfeited
assets. 92 The court did not reach the constitutional issue. Rather,
it avoided the sixth amendment argument by ruling that the forfeiture provision does not apply to attorneys' fees. 93 Accordingly, it
granted Caplin's claim. 94
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed on other grounds. 9 The three-justice panel held
that the Forfeiture Act does not expressly exempt attorneys' fees
from forfeiture, but its failure to do so impermissibly infringes
upon the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel, rendering
96
the provision unconstitutional.
Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit granted the government's petition for a rehearing en banc. 97 The court again ruled that the Forfeiture Act's unambiguous language provides no exemption for
90. Id. at 1194. The section of the Forfeiture Act that governs third-party interests
provides, inter alia, that the court shall amend its forfeiture order if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he has a "superior . . . right, title, or
interest ... at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture...
or... the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value.., and was at the time of purchase
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture ....
21
U.S.C. § 853(n)(6) (1988). However, the legislative history of this provision states:
"'Third parties who assert claims to criminally forfeitable property, which in essence are
challenges to the validity of the order of forfeiture, are entitled to a judicial determination
of their claim.'" Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1194 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note
9, at 208). Based on the legislative history, the district court concluded that Caplin was a
"good faith provider of services" with standing to present its claims, even though the firm
did not qualify for relief as a bona fide purchaser under the Act. Id.
91. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1194.
92. Id. The court described Caplin's status as "at least equal to that of a general
creditor." Id. The court had previously held that under the Forfeiture Act a general
creditor is accorded the opportunity to establish a valid claim to the defendant's assets,
which, otherwise are presumed to be forfeitable to the government. Id. at 1193 n. 1.
93. Id. at 1194-96. The court cited Rogers, Badalamenti, and Ianniello in holding
that Congress did not intend for the Forfeiture Act to "encompass bona fide legal fees
paid to a criminal defendant's attorney." Id. at 1195 (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 1198.
95. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 909 (4th Cir. 1987), supersededsub noma.
In re Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 839 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub
nom. Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
96. Id.
97. In re Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 638 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
aff'd sub nor. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
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attorneys' fees. 9" In reconsidering the constitutional issue, however, a majority of the court reversed its prior decision and held
that the statutory scheme does not violate a defendant's sixth
amendment rights.9 9 Four justices dissented, agreeing with the
original panel's view that the Forfeiture Act violates the sixth
amendment because it fails to exempt legal fees from
confiscation. 100

B.

United States v. Monsanto
1. The Facts

In a similar case two years later, the government returned an
indictment that charged Peter Monsanto with two RICO counts,
one CCE count, several firearms counts, and one drug conspiracy
count.' 0 1 This time, however, the government sought forfeiture of
98. Id. at 640-42.
99. Id. at 642-48. The court began by stating that a criminal defendant has the absolute right to representation either by retained counsel or by appointed counsel. Id. at 643.
The court rejected the scenario of drug defendants being forced to conduct their own
defense as an unrealistic hypothesis. Id. Further, the court dismissed Caplin's argument
that "the presumption of innocence forbids any interference with a defendant's property
prior to a guilty verdict." Id. The court emphasized that the presumption of innocence is
important "in assigning the burden of proof at trial, but is not a grant of immunity from
pretrial inconvenience." Id. Although due process strictures do not convey an absolute
right to be free from pretrial inconveniences, the court did concede that an objection to
pretrial inconveniences based on procedures might succeed. Id. at 644. However, Caplin
did not bring a due process challenge before the court. Id.
Having established that the right to counsel of one's choosing is a "qualified" right, the
court held that the Forfeiture Act does not violate the sixth amendment. Id. The court
cited many grounds for its decision. First, the court refused to accord "a unique and
favored constitutional status" to the class of criminal defendants unable to hire counsel
with their own assets. Id. at 646. Second, the court rejected the contention that "appointed counsel are presumptively unqualified to handle [CCE] cases." Id. Third, the
court did not accept the assertion that "fee forfeiture ...[would] create impediments to
attorney-client communication and conflicts of interest" and stated that this danger is
"more theoretical than real." Id. at 647. Finally, the court stated that an outright ban on
fee forfeiture would be an "unwarranted judicial intervention into the legislative arena."
Id. at 648. Because fee forfeiture may support important public interests, the court held
that the "balancing of personal and public interests is presumptively a matter of legislative prerogative." Id. at 648-49.
100. Id. at 651-53 (Phillips, J., dissenting). "The sixth amendment prevents governmental freeze orders and forfeitures whose effect is to deprive criminal defendants of their
ability, otherwise present, to employ private counsel for their defense against the underlying charges on which the freeze order or forfeiture is based." Id. at 652-53 (Phillips, J.,
dissenting).
101. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1987), modified, 852
F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S.Ct. 2657 (1989). Monsanto allegedly
directed a large-scale heroin distribution enterprise and had accumulated various assets
as a result of his narcotics trafficking, specifically two parcels of residential real property
valued at $365,000 plus $35,000 in cash. Id. at 76.
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Monsanto's assets before trial by requesting an ex parte postindictment restraining order under the Forfeiture Act.1 °2 The district
court 3granted the motion, freezing the specified assets pending
0

trial. 1

Monsanto attempted to secure private counsel, but several attorneys declined to represent him because of the threat of fee forfeiture. °4 Counsel pro tem intervened on Monsanto's behalf and
petitioned the court to vacate or modify the restraining order to
allow Monsanto to secure private counsel. 10 5 Counsel also sought
a declaration that if the relief were granted and the assets became
available to pay attorneys' fees, the government could not employ
the Forfeiture Act's third-party transfer clause' °6 to reclaim the
Failure to
payments if Monsanto subsequently were convicted.'
modify the restraining order, counsel insisted, would interfere with
Monsanto's sixth amendment right to counsel of his choice. 08
At a hearing, counsel pro tern informed the court that Monsanto
had contacted several trial attorneys, but none of them were willing to represent Monsanto for the amount of compensation provided by the Criminal Justice Act. 'o The trial judge conceded that
Monsanto was effectively indigent as a result of the restraining
order. 110
2.

The Procedural History

The district court denied Monsanto's motion to modify the restraining order.'
The court interpreted the forfeiture provision to
102. Id (citing 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985)); see also supra note 30
(quoting Forfeiture Act § 413(f)(1) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (1988))).
103. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 76. The order prohibited Monsanto from "alienating or
in any way depreciating [the] two parcels of real property... specified in [the] indictment
as constituting and derived from the proceeds of violations of [CCE]." Id. at 75 (citing
21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 and Supp. III 1985)). The government did not seek forfeiture of
the $35,000 in cash under the order. Id. at 76 n.2.
104. Id. At the initial pretrial conference, an attorney from Boston audited the proceedings but declined to enter a formal appearance on Monsanto's behalf. Id. The assistant United States attorney made clear that he would not enter into an agreement to
exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture. Id. Nor would the trial justice allow an exemption from fee forfeiture in excess of the hourly rates established by the Criminal Justice
Act. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1988).
105. Id.
106. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988); see also supra note 30 (quoting Forfeiture Act
§ 413(c) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988))).
107. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 84.
108. Id. at 75-76.
109. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 76.
110. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1988).
111. Id.
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include assets earmarked for attorneys' fees. 112 The court also rejected Monsanto's contention
that the restraining order violated
13
his constitutional rights."
On expedited appeal, Monsanto argued that the correct interpretation of the Forfeiture Act did not embrace attorneys' fees." 4 The
United States District Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected Monsanto's statutory construction," 5 but found in his favor
on the constitutional issues." 6 Although disinclined to establish an
absolute rule exempting property earmarked for attorneys' fees, the
court was equally reluctant to allow the government "to impose
indigence and deprive RICO and CCE defendants of the opportunity to retain private counsel merely by obtaining an indictment." ' 7 Accordingly, the court ruled that the government is
required to hold a pretrial adversarial hearing whenever it seeks
forfeiture of a defendant's assets if such forfeiture
implicates the
8
defendant's ability to pay attorneys' fees."
The court also stated that if a restraining order is upheld after an
adversarial hearing, the defendant's sixth amendment rights are
satisfied by providing the accused with court-appointed counsel. 19
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 78.
115. Id. at 78-80. The court followed the reasoning expressed in United States v.
Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), superseded sub nom. In re Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Caplin, & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2646 (1989), in construeing the Forfeiture Act.
Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 78 (citing Harvey, 814 F.2d at 913-16) (cases finding congressional
exemption of nonfraudulent attorneys' fees err in their statutory interpretation). The
Monsanto court reached its conclusion on two grounds: first, the statute's plain language
contained no exception for attorneys' fees, and second, because the legislative history of
the statute is inconclusive and does not express an intent contrary to the plain meaning of
the statute, the plain meaning must prevail. Id. at 78-79.
116. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 80-85. Although Monsanto raised the sixth amendment
issue on appeal, the court of appeals raised and addressed the fifth amendment issue sua
sponte. Id. at 82-83.
117. Id. at 82. The court stated that such a rule would give the government "the
ultimate tactical advantage of being able to exclude competent counsel as it chooses." Id.
(citing Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985)). Therefore, the court focused on
the fifth amendment protections as a source of "compromise between the statutorily posited interests of the government and the qualified right of a defendant to retain counsel of
his choice." Id.
118. Id. n.7. To the extent that an adversarial hearing is not provided after a postindictment restraining order is issued, the court held that the Forfeiture Act violates fifth
amendment due process guarantees. Id. at 83 (citing United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d
905, 929 (4th Cir. 1987), superseded sub nom. In re Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837
F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 109 S.Ct. 2646 (1989)).
119. Id. The court of appeals agreed with the trial judge that forfeitable assets may
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If the government does not meet its burden at the adversarial hearing, 20 the court noted, the district court should order that any
funds used to pay legitimate attorneys' fees will be exempt from
posttrial forfeiture. 12 ' The Second Circuit remanded the case for
an adversarial hearing, at which the government had to establish
the likelihood of Monsanto's conviction, and the2 2probability that
the targeted property was potentially forfeitable.
On remand, the district court upheld the restraining order because the government had met its burden in establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that Monsanto's assets were most
likely subject to forfeiture. 23 While Monsanto's trial was in progress, the Second Circuit vacated its earlier holding and heard
Monsanto's appeal en banc.'24 This time, the appellate court ordered the district court to modify its restraining order by allowing
Monsanto to use the frozen assets to pay his attorneys' fees. 25 In
reaching its decision, however, the appellate court was sharply divided.' 26 Three judges found that the order violated the sixth
amendment; 27 three judges invalidated the order on statutory
be "invaded for the purpose of paying any private attorney of the defendant's choice who
would be willing [to provide services at Criminal Justice Act rates]." Id. at 85.
120. The court of appeals concurred in the view that the government must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt both that the defendant has violated the statute and that
the assets are subject to forfeiture. Id (citing United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985); United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 618
(9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981)). The court also
stated that the government must meet this burden with evidence independent of the indictment. Id.
121. Id. at 84.
122. Id. at 85.
123. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd,
109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
124. Id Monsanto's trial was in progress in the district court where he was represented by court-appointed counsel. Id.
125. Id. The court also held that "any such fees paid to Monsanto's defense counsel
[were] exempt from subsequent forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(c)." Id; see also
supra note 30 (quoting Forfeiture Act § 413(c) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988))).
126. Id. at 1402-21.
127. Id. at 1402-04 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring). These judges believed that "to the
extent [that the forfeiture provisions] prevent an indicted defendant who would otherwise
be able to retain counsel of his choice from doing so, they are unconstitutional." Id. at
1402 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring). Further, these judges did not believe that the majority's adversarial hearing was "sufficient to overcome the constitutional infirmities." Id.
(Feinberg, C.J., concurring). The judges reached this conclusion by emphasizing that the
sixth amendment secures a "fundamental right" that cannot be infringed absent a compelling governmental interest, and that the government's goal of preserving potentially
forfeitable assets is not sufficiently "compelling." Id. at 1402-03 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring). They reasoned that the "small societal cost of allowing criminals to use their illegally obtained wealth to hire an attorney.., is the price [society] must pay for protecting
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grounds; 28 two judges found that the Forfeiture Act's failure to
provide for a hearing such as the one ordered by the panel raised
three dissenting judges argued to
due process concerns; 29 and the
30
uphold the restraining order.

C.

The United States Supreme Court Decisions

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in both
cases to resolve the conflict among the circuits' 3 ' regarding the isthe rights of the innocent, who might otherwise be deprived of legitimate economic power
in waging a full defense." Id. at 1403 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring).
The judges distinguished the government's reliance on United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739 (1987). Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1403 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring). In Salerno,
the court held "that an accused's liberty interest may sometimes be overcome by the
compelling governmental interest in coping with an immediate threat to public safety."
Id. (Feinberg, C.J., concurring) (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748). The governmental interest in the present case, argued the judges, was not "anywhere near as compelling as
that." Id. (Feinberg, C.J., concurring). Similarly, although these judges recognized that
the right to counsel can be limited or infringed, they noted that the "right to counsel in
this case is destroyed almost completely by depriving the defendant of the means to retain
counsel of choice prior to. . . trial." Id. at 1402 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring). But see
United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 219-20 (2d. Cir. 1987) (right to counsel not
violated by disqualifying a particular lawyer); United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 392
(2d Cir. 1986) (right to counsel not infringed when court prevents a defendant from substituting counsel once the trial has begun), cert denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
128. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1405 (Winter, J., concurring). These judges concluded
that "the statute in question does not permit the preconviction restraint of funds needed
... to make... expenditures to retain private legal counsel," and that "expenditures
expressly authorized by the district court for such purposes are not subject to postconviction forfeiture." Id (Winter, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 1411 (Miner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The two
judges believed that a notice and hearing procedure, though necessary to satisfy due process requirements, is beyond the power of the judiciary to create. Id. (Miner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Such specific procedural matters... are better left
for legislative determination after a finding of unconstitutionality." Id. (Miner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, although the two judges agreed with the
majority that a postindictment restraining order cannot be issued without an adversarial
hearing, they argued that "the procedural safeguards necessary to satisfy due process
requirements here must be established by Congress rather than by the Court." Id
(Miner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
dissenting). Two of the dissenting judges disagreed
130. Id at 1412-21 (Mahoney, J.,
with a "blanket rule exempting from forfeiture all assets required for non-sham counsel
fees" and found all the concurring opinions that reached that result unpersuasive. Id. at
1418 (Mahoney, J., dissenting). Furthermore, they chastised the majority for its "virtually total disregard of every pertinent opinion from [the] sister circuits" that had reached
contrary results on the issue of attorney fee forfeiture. Id. (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988) (a restraining order does not "violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.., but
...violates due process if [the] defendant claims that it interferes with his ability to hire
counsel and [the] Government does not demonstrate [that the assets are potentially forfeitable], or the court does not release sufficient funds to pay for counsel"); United States
v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988) (forfeiture provision provides no exception for
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sues associated with fee forfeiture. 32 In its decisions, the Court
affirmed the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States' 3 and reversed the Second Circuit's
holding in United States v. Monsanto. 34 The majority arrived at
three major holdings: (1) proceeds intended for payment of attorneys' fees are not exempt from forfeiture; 35 (2) forfeiture is
mandatory whether under a postconviction order or a pretrial restraining order, allowing no room for the exercise of judicial discretion;' 36 and (3) the Forfeiture Act violates 3neither
the fifth nor
7
the sixth amendment rights of the defendant.1
1. The Forfeiture Act Provides No Exception for Attorneys'
Fees
The Supreme Court first analyzed the scope of the Forfeiture
Act. 38 The Court rejected Monsanto's contention that the Forfeiture Act is ambiguous. 39 Instead, the Court ruled that the language of the Act is "broad and unambiguous."'"
The Court
reasoned that the statutory language unequivocally indicates that
forfeiture is mandatory and supports no exception for attorneys'
4

fees.1

1

attorneys' fees, and it is constitutional to require the defendants to forfeit assets otherwise
targeted for legal counsel); United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332, vacated, 844 F.2d 215
(5th Cir. 1988) (even though defense attorneys requested payment for fees after the defendant's conviction, the property that had been pledged for legal services was exempt
from forfeiture).
132. Both cases raised substantially the same issues: forfeiture of attorneys' fees and
the sixth amendment right to counsel of choice. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2649 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 2659
(1989). The majority wrote two separate opinions to resolve those issues, however, because petitioners in Caplin argued their status as "bona fide purchasers" with a valid
claim against the forfeited assets, whereas the respondent in Monsanto challenged the
validity of a pretrial restraining order that prevented him from liquidating any of his
assets in order to obtain defense counsel of his choice.
133. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989), aff'g sub nor. In re Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837
F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); see supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
134. 109 S.Ct. 2657 (1989), rev'g 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc); see supra
notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
135. Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. at 2661-65.
136. Caplin, 109 S.Ct. at 2650-51; Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. at 2664-65.
137. Caplin, 109 S.Ct. at 2651-57; Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. at 2665-67.
138. Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. at 2662 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580
(1981) ("[i]n determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language")).
139. Id. at 2662-63.
140. Id. at 2663.
141. Id. at 2662 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988), which provides, inter alia, that a
person "shall forfeit ...any property" and a sentencing court "shall order" forfeiture of
"all property described in this subsection"). The Court focused on the statutory language
to emphasize that "Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent
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The Court also rejected the notion that because the Forfeiture
Act does not expressly mention attorney's fees, Congress did not
intend to require forfeiture of assets that could be used to pay
them 42 Rather, the Court interpreted the absence of a phrase expressly including attorneys' fees as a further indication of the Forfeiture Act's breadth, not limitation.143 Likewise, Monsanto was
unsuccessful in his attempts to persuade the Court that the Forfeiture Act's legislative history justifies a narrow construction of the
statute. 144
Finally, the Court drew an analogy to the Victims of Crime Act
(Crime Act),1 45 passed under the same bill as the Forfeiture Act. 46

In the Crime Act, Congress deliberately provided that payments
for legal representation of the defendant are exempt from forfeiture.' 47 The Court reasoned that when Congress expressly adopted
such a provision in the Crime Act, it certainly understood the effect of omitting this exception from the Forfeiture Act. 4 Thus,
that forfeiture be mandatory in cases where the statute applied or broader words to define
the scope of what was to be forfeited." Id.
142. Id at 2662-63. To buttress its position that the statute should be given a liberal
application, the Court also referenced the House Judiciary Committee's discussion of the
"failure of previous, more lax forfeiture statutes." Id at 2662 n.8 (citing HOUSE REPORT,

supra note 26, at 3).

143. Id at 2663. The respondent pointed out that the legislative history is "silent" on
the question of attorneys' fees, but the Court noted that "the legislative history and congressional debates are similarly silent on the use of forfeitable assets to pay stockbroker's
fees, laundry bills, or country club memberships." Id The court reasoned that nobody
would contend seriously that the defendant could retain potentially forfeitable assets to
pay for those services, and, therefore, the omission of an express exemption for attorneys'
fees "demonstrates breadth," not ambiguity. Id "Congress's failure to supplement
§ 853(a)'s comprehensive phrase - 'any property' - with an exclamatory 'and we even
mean assets to be used to pay an attorney' does not lessen the force of the statute's plain
language." Id
144. Id Monsanto cited the following passage from the legislative history to support
the inference that Congress intended to exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture: "'Nothing in this section is intended to interfere with a person's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. The Committee, therefore, does not resolve the conflict in District Court opinions on the use of restraining orders that impinge on a person's right to retain counsel in a
criminal case.'" Id. at 2663 n.8 (quoting HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 19 n.1).
Because the House Report did not disapprove of cases in which pretrial restraining orders
were imposed, the Court interpreted the same passage only for the proposition that the
courts should "tread carefully in this delicate area." Id.
145. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3681-3682 (1988).
146. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1406(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2175-76
(1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3681-3682 (1988)).
147. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2664. The Crime Act's forfeiture provision expressly
exempts "pay[ments] for legal representation of the defendant in matters arising from the
offense for which such defendant has been convicted, but no more than 20 percent of the
total [forfeited collateral profits] may be so used." 18 U.S.C. § 3681(c)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
148. Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. at 2664.
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the Court determined that attorneys' fees are not exempt from for'
feiture because "Congress did not write the statute that way."149
2.

Forfeiture Is Mandatory Under the Act

The Forfeiture Act provides that "the court may enter a restraining order or injunction" to preserve a defendant's forfeitable
assets.'5 0 The Second Circuit interpreted this language to mean
that a trial judge could apply "'traditional principles of equity'"
before granting the government's request for a pretrial restraining
order.'51 The Supreme Court rejected this permissive reading and
held that the Forfeiture Act does not give the trial court authority
to allow a defendant to withhold assets to pay bona fide attorneys'
fees. 152
In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked to Congress's purpose in enacting the Forfeiture Act, which was to guarantee that a
defendant's potentially forfeitable assets are preserved in the event
of conviction. 5 3 The Court reasoned that Congress inserted the
very potent third-party transfer provision5 4 and "any property...
any proceeds" language1 55 to insure the Forfeiture Act's effectiveness. 5 6 The Court refused to permit these powerful provisions to
be "nullified by [another section] of the statute."'5 7 The Court
stated that the Forfeiture Act does not give the district court discretion to dissipate the very property that Congress sought to preserve. 1" If Congress did intend to give discretion to the district
149. Id. (quoting United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773 (1979)).
150. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (1988) (emphasis added); see also supra note 30 (quoting
Forfeiture Act § 413(a) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988))).
151. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2664 (quoting United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d
1400, 1406 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Winter, J., concurring)). In his concurring opinion
below, Judge Winter concluded that "the purpose of the hearing [after the entry of a
restraining order] is ... to allow an informed balancing of the relative hardships on the
parties ... with regard to preconviction restraints upon a defendant's assets." Monsanto,
852 F.2d at 1406 (Winter, J., concurring). Such a balancing, Judge Winter concluded,
"should be struck so as to allow a defendant to continue to make ordinary lawful expenditures, including expenditures to retain private legal counsel." Id. (Winter, J.,
concurring).
152. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) permits the forfeiture of a
defendant's assets after conviction; § 853(e) permits the government to freeze an accused's assets after an indictment, but before conviction. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c), (e) (1988).
153. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 204).
154. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988); see also supra note 30 (quoting Forfeiture Act
§ 413(c) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988))).
155. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) (1988); see also supra note 30 (quoting Forfeiture Act
§ 413(a)(1) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) (1988))).
156. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665.
157. Id.
158. Id. The Court stated that Congress decided to give force to the old adage that
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court, the Court remarked, it should amend the Forfeiture Act
59
accordingly. 1
3.

Constitutional Rights Are Not Compromised Under the
Forfeiture Act

After disposing of the extraconstitutional challenges to the Forfeiture Act, the Court squarely confronted the sixth amendment
question. In a three-step analysis, the majority dismissed the constitutional challenges to the Forfeiture Act. 60 First, the Court
considered Caplin's argument that, as interpreted, the Forfeiture
Act impermissibly burdens a defendant's right "to select and be
represented by one's preferred attorney."'116 The Court found this
assertion "untenable" because the right to counsel does not grant
the defendant the right to spend another person's money, even if
the defendant has no other funds with which to hire private counsel. 62 The Forfeiture Act, according to the Court, does not burden
defendants unduly, because it allows the defendant to use assets
not subject to forfeiture to retain an attorney and preserves the
defendant's63 ability to obtain a government-paid attorney if
necessary.1

Second, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Forfei"crime does not pay," and did not intend to modify that notion to read, "crime does not
pay, except for attorney's fees." Id.
159. Id. The Court pointed to Congress's refusal to act on the defense bar's repeated
suggestions to modify the Forfeiture Act to include an exemption for attorneys' fees. The
Court found this refusal to be significant evidence of congressional intent to make the
Act as expansive as possible in order to close off loopholes previously available. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2663 (citing Attorneys' Fees Forfeiture: Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 148-213 (1986); ForfeitureIssues: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 187-242 (1985)).
160. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2645, 2651 (1989);
Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 2665-66 (1989). Caplin's first claim was that the statutory
scheme of the Forfeiture Act grants the district court discretion to determine when pretrial restraining orders are appropriate. Caplin, 109 S.Ct. at 2650-51. Failing this argument, the petitioners contended that the forfeiture provision infringes a criminal
defendant's fifth amendment due process guarantees and the sixth amendment right to
counsel. Id. at 2651.
Monsanto argued that the forfeiture provision does not require the forfeiture of assets
that the accused intends to use to pay legal fees. Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. at 2662. Monsanto
urged the Court to interpret the Act to provide an exception for legal fees when a pretrial
restraining order is entered. Id. at 2664. If the statute does not provide exemptions for
legal fees, Monsanto argued, it violates the fifth and sixth amendments. Id. at 2666.
161. Caplin, 109 S.Ct. at 2652 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159
(1988)).
162. Id. at 2652.
163. Id.

1990]

War on Drugs

ture Act's third-party transfer provision. 164 Although it acknowledged the protections afforded by the sixth amendment, the Court
ruled that those protections do not include the right to "give another's property to a third party," even when the transferor does so
"to exercise a constitutionally protected right.11 6 Caplin attempted to distinguish the expenditure of forfeitable assets to exercise a right to counsel from the expenditure of assets in the pursuit
of other constitutional rights.166 The Court, however, refused to
elevate the sixth amendment to a special status or create a hierar67
chy among constitutional rights.
Third, the Court stated that the governmental interest in obtaining full recovery of forfeitable assets outweighs a defendant's
sixth amendment interest in using suspect assets to pay for legal
representation.168 The Court reiterated the notion that the sixth
amendment does not grant a defendant the right to use the proceeds of crime to finance an expensive defense. 69 In short, the
Supreme Court's decision means that no antiforfeiture exception
exists for the exercise of sixth amendment rights. 70
Finally, the Court summarily disposed of the fifth amendment
issue. 7' Both Caplin and Monsanto argued that the forfeiture provision upsets the "balance of forces between the accused and his
accuser."' 72 In addressing this claim, the Court began by commenting that the fifth amendment adds nothing to a defendant's
sixth amendment protections. 73 Even if the fifth amendment adds
164. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988).
165. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2653-54. The court reasoned that merely because the defendant transfers his assets to an attorney in the exercise of his constitutional right to
counsel does not change the analysis of forfeitability. Id. If the attorney had reason to
believe the assets were forfeitable, then he is excluded from the bona fide purchaser exception. Id.
166. Id. at 2654.
167. Id. For example, the Court noted that a defendant has no right to spend forfeitable assets for the exercise of his right to speak, practice his religion, or to travel. Id.
Because the "full exercise of these rights, too, depends in part on one's financial wherewithal," and because those rights are just as important as the right to counsel, the Court
would not elevate the sixth amendment to special status as the petitioner and respondent
urged. Id.
168. Id. at 2654-55.
169. Id. at 2655 (citing In re Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 649 (4th
Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109
S. Ct. 2646 (1989)).
170. Id. at 2654.
171. Id. at 2656-57.
172. Id. at 2656 (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973)).
173. Id. The Court remarked that although "[t]he Constitution guarantees a fair trial
through the Due Process Clauses ... it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely
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additional safeguards, the Court stated, due process claims can be
raised only in "specific cases of prosecutorial misconduct."' 74 On
this basis, the Court rejected the notion that criminal laws with a
mere potential for abuse require a finding of facial invalidity. 75 Incan be dealt with
stead, particular abuses, if and when they occur,
1 76
courts.
lower
the
by
basis
on a case-by-case
D.

The Dissent 177

Justice Blackmun, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, disagreed with the majority's statutory and constitutional interpretations.7 7 First, the dissent argued that the
Forfeiture Act unambiguously reveals Congress's intent to exempt
attorneys' fees from the forfeiture provision; therefore, the Court
should not have addressed the constitutional issues. 179 Second, the
through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment." Id. (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984)).
174. Id. at 2657. The Court noted that although an act " 'might operate unconstitutionally under some [hypothetical] set of circumstances,'" that fact alone does not render
it invalid. Id (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).
175. Id. (quoting In re Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 648 (4th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (" '[e]very criminal law carries with it a potential for abuse, but a potential for abuse does not require a finding of facial invalidity' "), aff'd sub nom. Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989)). The Court held that Caplin's argument "proves too much" since virtually every legal tool at the government's
disposal carries a latent potential for abuse. Id.
176. Id.; see also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) (the Court declined to fashion a per se unconstitutional rule, instead observing that "trial courts are
undoubtedly aware of [the] possibility of abuse, and would have to 'take it into consideration' when dealing with disqualification motions").
In addition, Monsanto argued that freezing an accused's assets before conviction and
before a determination of which assets are forfeitable raises "distinct constitutional concerns." Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. at 2666. However, the Court held that the government may
seize property after a showing of probable cause that the property eventually will be
linked to the illegal activity. Id.; see also supra note 33. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that because the government is not ousting the defendant from his property, but
merely preventing him from disposing of it, the governmental intrusion in this context is
even "less severe" than that permitted in other contexts. Monsanto, 109 S.Ct. at 2666.
Therefore, the government can restrain the assets at issue after meeting the threshold
burden. Id. at 2667.
177. Although the cases went up separately to the Supreme Court and the majority
issued two separate opinions, the dissent wrote one opinion that applied to both cases.
Caplin, 109 S.Ct. 2667 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2667 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). Both the Caplin decision and the
Monsanto decision were decided by 5-4 votes, indicating that the issue of fee forfeiture
was and will continue to be a controversial issue.
179. Id. at 2668-72 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). The dissent's analysis was based on
the "cardinal principle of statutory construction [that] statutes should be construed to
avoid an unconstitutional interpretation." Winick, supra note 39, at 839; see also
DeBartolo v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988) ("where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious con-
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dissent stated that if Congress did intend the Forfeiture Act to
reach attorneys' fees, then the forfeiture provision is clearly at odds
with the sixth amendment right to counsel. 80
1. The Forfeiture Act Provides an Exception
for Attorneys' Fees
The dissent first stated that the Court could have resolved the
dispute at the statutory level with a proper analysis of the language
of the Forfeiture Act. The dissent pointed out that the majority
acknowledged the Act's failure expressly to provide for the forfeiture of attorneys' fees.' 8 ' The dissent, however, rejected the majority's conclusion that the lack of an express exemption
for
182
unambiguous.
Act
Forfeiture
the
renders
fees
attorneys'
Next, the dissent focused on the statutory language, which states
that " 'any person convicted' " shall forfeit property. 1 3 That language, the dissent reasoned, does not govern property in possession
of third parties, such as attorneys to whom assets have been transferred, because attorneys are not "persons convicted."' 8 4 Rather,
according to the dissent's analysis, the third-party transfer provision'18s controls the disposition of assets in the attorney's possession. ' 6 The dissent argued that the permissive language of that
section vests the district courts8 with
discretion to decide whether
7
to restrain a defendant's assets.
Similarly, the dissent noted that the Act's preconviction forfeiture provision 88 employs the same discretionary language as the
stitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such a construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"); Jean v. Nelson, 472
U.S. 846, 854 (1985) (citing Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 157
(1984) (the fundamental rule of judicial restraint requires that courts not pass on questions of constitutionality unless such adjudication is unavoidable)); NLRB v. Catholic
Bishops, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) ("an Act of Congress ought not be construed to violate
the Constitution if any other possible construction remains available"); United States v.
Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1409 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) ("if anything remains of the
canon that statutes capable of differing interpretations should be construed to avoid constitutional issues . . . it surely applies here"), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989). For an indepth discussion of alternatives to adjudicating the constitutional issue, see Winick, supra
note 39, at 838-65.
180. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2667 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
182. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
183. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988)).
184. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988)).
185. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988).
186. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 2668-69 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
188. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (1988).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 22

third-party forfeiture section. 18 9 According to the dissent's rationale, the government has no absolute right to forfeitable property, or
to a court order safeguarding a defendant's assets pending resolution of the criminal charges against him.190 Instead, the Forfeiture
Act grants the district court discretion to decide whether to include attorneys' fees in the special forfeiture verdict or to award
preconviction injunctive relief.191 The Forfeiture Act, then, is not
"unambiguous" but is, after careful analysis, amenable to a different, nonconstitutional interpretation that, in the dissent's view, the
1 92
majority should have embraced.
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority for reading into the
Forfeiture Act an overly broad purpose. 193 According to the dissent, the majority's analysis condones the forfeiture of property for
its own sake, an interpretation of the Forfeiture Act that the dissent found to be clearly at odds with legislative intent.'94 The dissent remarked that no "important and legitimate purpose" is
served by requiring postconviction forfeiture of funds earmarked as
attorneys' fees or barring preconviction payment of fees.'9g On the
contrary, the Forfeiture Act leaves room for a "statutory discretion" approach to forfeiture; 96 in fact, the only correct construction of the Forfeiture Act, the dissent maintained, is one that gives
full effect to its discretionary language while preserving the sixth
amendment right to counsel. 197
2.

A Defendant's Sixth Amendment Rights Outweigh the
Government's Interests

Even if the Forfeiture Act is unambiguous and incapable of an
alternate construction, the dissent concluded that the majority
erred in its constitutional analysis. The dissent criticized the majority for emphasizing that because a defendant has no right to a
189. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2669 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2668-69 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
191. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 2668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 2669 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Congress's purpose in passing the Forfeiture Act was threefold: (1) to prevent the profits of criminal activity from being used in
future criminal activity, (2) to strip convicted criminals of assets and establish financial
penalties that are more than just a "'cost of doing business' ", and (3) to close a potential
loophole and prevent criminal assets from being transferred and preserved for future use
in the criminal organization. Id. at 2670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing HOUSE REPORT,

194.
195.
196.
197.

supra note 26, at 2, 6).
Id. at 2670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2671 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2671-72 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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lawyer that he cannot afford, the government is free to restrain the
defendant's assets and render him indigent. 19 The dissent contended that the sixth amendment's right to counsel of choice plays
a substantial role in preserving the adversarial system of criminal
justice. 199 Denial of the right to counsel of choice, the dissent
stated, would negatively affect two components of the criminal justice system: the private defense bar and the individual
defendant. °°
First, the dissent noted that although the courts have construed
the sixth amendment to guarantee, at the least, "minimally effective assistance of counsel," '0 1 the "preferred component" of the
sixth amendment's protections is the right to hire private counsel. 20 2 The looming threat of fee forfeiture, however, deflects even
the "best-intentioned of attorneys" from accepting a case if they
suspect that they will not be paid for their services.20 3 Such a scenario, the dissent argued, will discourage young attorneys from
joining the defense bar and cause an "exodus of talented [defense]
attorneys" already established in this field of law. 20 4 The dissent

warned that without "a healthy, independent defense bar" to insure a "truly equal and adversarial presentation of the case," our
system of criminal justice is imperiled.20 5
Second, in the dissenters' view, the majority's holding imperils
the defendant's ability to secure minimally effective legal counsel. 20 6 The dissent argued that because the defendant may be
198. Id. at 2672 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
153 (1988)).
199. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun emphasized that the sixth
amendment right to counsel of choice, which carves out an important role for the independent lawyer, functions as the" 'guardian of our freedom.'" Id. (citations omitted).
200. Id. at 2672-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 2672 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984)).
202. Id. (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (quoting United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905,
923 (4th Cir.), superseded sub nom. In re Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637
(4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
109 S.Ct. 2646 (1989)).
203. Id. at 2673 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Winick, supra note 39, at 781). "The
best attorneys in [the subspecialties of white collar and drug law bars] command shockingly high fees, although no more so than the most talented members of the securities,
antitrust, commercial litigation, or personal injury bars." Winick, supra note 39, at 781.
"Though the law's gradual transformation from a profession into a business is lamentable, in a society governed by the marketplace as ours is, attorneys . . .who find their
hourly rates slashed to the $40 to $60 per hour limits provided under the C[riminal]
J[ustice] A[ct] will move to other fields or decline to enter criminal practice." Id.
205. Caplin, 109 S.Ct. at 2674 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2673-75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "[W]hen the government provides for
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forced to accept the services of a court-appointed attorney, his relationship with that attorney is likely to begin on a hostile note, especially if the defendant had employed private counsel to represent
him earlier in the proceedings.2 °7 The defendant's lack of trust in
the qualifications of his court-appointed attorney will increase further, the dissent insisted, to the extent that the defendant might
believe that the appointment of counsel is a government tactic to
weaken his defense.20 s
Even if the defendant can find private counsel willing to risk
forfeiture of her fees, the dissent opined, the efficacy of the relationship between the defendant and his attorney will suffer because
"the attorney's interest in knowing nothing" about the source of
the client's wealth .is adverse to her "client's interest in full disclosure." 2°9 The dissent surmised that the result of this conflict might
be a less diligent investigation and presentation of the defendant's
case. 210 Under either scenario, the dissent concluded, the majority's construction of the Forfeiture Act threatens to undermine the
adversarial system of justice.211
Third, the dissent argued that the alleged governmental interests
appointed counsel, there is no guarantee that levels of compensation and staffing will be
even average.... Without the defendant's right to retain private counsel, the Government too readily could defeat its adversaries simply by outspending them." Id. at 2673
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra notes 17, 201 and accompanying text.
207. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2674 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
208. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 2675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 2674 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent was also disturbed by the
power that the forfeiture provision cedes to the government and the potential for its use
against a particularly talented defense attorney; that is, an "attorney who is better than
what, in the Governments's view, the defendant deserves." Id. at 2675 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Presumably, the government will be hostile to the defense attorney because
the government believes that the attorney has no right to receive payments out of the
defendant's assets on which, the government believes, it has a claim. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The forfeiture provisions, as interpreted by the majority, enable the government to dangle the threat of fee forfeiture over the attorney's head throughout his representation of the defendant, making it necessary for the attorney to defend both his client's
interests and his own. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The dissent also hypothesized that if the forfeiture mechanism is expanded to other
types of crimes, soon only "affluent defendant[s] accused of a crime that generates no
economic gain" will be able to retain private counsel. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). One
commentator has noted that the use of forfeiture as a method of punishment is likely to
increase because it is seemingly an obvious solution to society's burgeoning crime problem. Cloud, supra note 10, at 22. Undoubtedly, lawmakers will expand criminal forfeiture to other types of illegal activities, especially if the Forfeiture Act is a successful tool
in the fight against illegal drugs. Id. at 22-23.
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exalted by the majority were not persuasive.212 Depriving a defendant of" 'the best counsel money can buy' ",213 is not a substantial enough interest "'to justify invasion of a constitutional
right.' ",214 Even if the government's interests are worthy, the dissent continued, the majority's construction of the Forfeiture Act's
third-party transfer provision erects a statutory exemption for almost every "legitimate provide[r] of services" except attorneys.2 1 5
Attorneys are in an unfortunate position because they will rarely, if
ever, qualify under the bona fide purchaser exception. 6 As a result, the dissent concluded, the Forfeiture Act's burden falls almost
exclusively on the defendant's ability to exercise his constitutional
right to obtain counsel.21 7
2
Finally, the dissent rejected the notion that the probable cause I
hurdle serves as real protection against sixth amendment violations.2 19 The mere threat of forfeiture, insisted the dissent, will
render any rational attorney reluctant to represent the accused regardless of whether the government can satisfy the statutory standard.22° In short, the dissent asserted that the majority's
construction of the Forfeiture Act all but nullifies the long established right to counsel afforded by the sixth amendment and nega212. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2676 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
213. Id (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
214. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d
1400, 1403 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Feinberg, C.J., concurring), rev'd, 109 S.Ct. 2657
(1989)). The dissent maintained that regardless of the government's alleged interests, it is
trying to protect an interest in the defendant's assets when, in fact, it has no property
interest in the defendant's assets before conviction. Id. at 2676-77 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
215. Id at 2678 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
216. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent singled out the defendant's attorney
as the person most unlikely to qualify under the Forfeiture Act's bona fide purchaser
exemption because the "attorney... cannot do his job (or at least cannot do his job well)
without asking questions that will reveal the source of the defendant's assets." Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent conceded that criminal defendants
certainly are not exempt from federal, state, and local taxes just because the taxes will cut
into funds potentially available to pay an attorney. Id.n. 16 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
The dissent insisted, however, that most observers would conclude that the current drug
penalties, which target payments to criminal defense attorneys but exempt personal service transactions, place an undue burden on the defendant's exercise of sixth amendment
rights. Id. at 2678 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). The burdening of a defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel is, in the dissent's view, not just an unfortunate consequence
of the Forfeiture Act but the government's very purpose in enacting the statute. Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
218. See supra note 33.
219. Id. at 2677 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
220. Id. (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
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tively impacts every interest protected by the sixth amendment, on
both the individual and institutional levels.221

IV.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court's decisions in Caplin and Monsanto are significant in two respects: (1) they depart from the cardinal principle
of statutory construction in favor of avoiding a constitutional interpretation when possible; 222 and (2) they signal that in moments of
public outrage, the judicial branch is willing to sacrifice basic constitutional rights in favor of the alleged needs of law enforcement
agencies. 223 The majority's ruling seriously jeopardizes the sixth
amendment rights of RICO and CCE defendants, 224 and writes a
presumed congressional intent into the Forfeiture Act. In arriving
at this result, the Court misread Congress's silence as an implied
expression of affirmative intent and overstated the government's interest in obtaining full recovery of forfeited assets at the expense of
the sixth amendment.
A.

Room for a Statutory Exception Approach

Before the Court could address the constitutional issue, it had to
reject the argument that the Forfeiture Act was capable of more
than one interpretation. It did so by reading the Forfeiture Act's
virtual silence regarding the use of assets for legal fees as support
for a liberal construction of the Act. 225 The Court, however, easily
could have read the Forfeiture Act's silence for the opposite proposition: that Congress did not intend forfeiture to apply to attorneys' fees.226 Such an interpretation, in light of Congress's stated
goal in passing the Act,22 7 would have left the Court with an opportunity to recognize a statutory exception for attorneys' fees.
The Forfeiture Act applies to any property and proceeds of the
accused, but provides an exception for bona fide purchasers reasonably without cause to believe that the assets potentially were for221. Id. at 2667-78 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
222. Winick, supra note 39, at 839 n.365.
223. Id. at 865-69.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 218-21.
225. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2662-63 (1989). The only reference to
the right to counsel in the legislative history was a footnoted comment in the House
Report: "Nothing in this section is intended to interfere with a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 19 n. 1; see also supra note 34
and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 181-97 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 11 and 193.
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feitable. 22s Dentists, doctors, and the local grocer, who rarely
know the true sources of a client's wealth, presumably will be able
to resist any government-initiated forfeiture proceeding to recover
assets in their possession.229
Like dentists and doctors, criminal defense attorneys provide a
service to the defendant. Because the service that they provide requires open and frank communication regarding sensitive criminal
charges, however, criminal defense attorneys rarely will pass the
"without cause to believe" test.230 As a consequence, the majority's interpretation of the Forfeiture Act apparently singles out defense attorneys for prejudicial treatment.
The Court misconstrued the real purpose of the forfeiture provision. 231' Congress sought to separate convicted criminals from their
economic power base and to close potential loopholes through the
oeii
elimi
did not intend to
third-party transfer provision. 232 Congress ddntitn
nate private counsel from RICO and CCE prosecutions.
Because requiring forfeiture of assets transferred to attorneys in
exchange for legitimate legal services effectively deprives the defendant of the use of his assets in the same way as a restraining
order or injunction, "the government should be indifferent to the
identity of the recipient of the assets."

233

Under either scenario,

the end result is the same: the defendant is prevented from pouring
those assets back into the illegal enterprise. Therefore, it should be
228. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
229. Winick, supra note 39, at 785.
230. Id. at 785-86. Winick states that the local grocer would likely qualify as a "bona
fide purchaser... reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture." 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988). Criminal defense lawyers, on the other hand,
invariably are on notice that their clients' payments may be from the proceeds of crime.
Winick, supra note 39, at 785. Because they will almost never qualify as bona fide purchasers due to the nature of attorney-client relationships, criminal defense lawyers are
deterred from taking these cases, which drastically reduces their client base. Id at 786.
If the defense lawyer does accept a RICO- or CCE-related case, he may have to forfeit his
fees to the government. Id. In the words of Scott Wallace of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, "The Clarence Darrows of the world will be doing wills for
old ladies." Court Orders: Dealing with Porn and Drugs, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1989, at
20; see also Cocaine's "Dirty300", NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 1989, at 44 (the threat of asset
seizures has forced one prominent defense attorney to drop most of his drug practice).
231. '[W]eakening the ability of an accused to defend himself at trial is an advantage for the government. But it is not a legitimate government interest that can
be used to justify the invasion of a constitutional right.' And the legitimate
interests the Government asserts are far too weak to justify the Act's substantial
erosion of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2667, 2676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
232. See supra notes 12, 32 and accompanying text.
233. Cloud, supra note 10, at 46-47.
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immaterial to the government if the defendant applies a portion of
his assets toward financing a defense. Accordingly, because no legitimate purpose is served by requiring postconviction forfeiture of
attorneys' fees or preventing preconviction payment of fees, the
majority should have adopted a construction of the Forfeiture Act
that preserves an exception for those fees.2 34
Finally, the Court pointed to Congress's failure to act on repeated suggestions by the defense bar to include an exemption for
attorneys' fees as further evidence of congressional intent to make
the Forfeiture Act expansive.2 35 One result of the majority's interpretation of the Act's application, however, is to aid the prosecution by depleting the pool of private defense counsel available to
defendants. Regardless of Congress's stated or unstated intentions,
the Court should not sanction a use of the Forfeiture Act that produces an unfair advantage. The Court has no obligation to defer to
Congress when it enacts legislation in conflict with the constitutional guarantees of a fair trial. The majority could have restored
the balance of forces between the government and the accused by
resolving the issue of fee forfeiture in favor of the accused. Such a
decision would have avoided a constitutional interpretation of the
Forfeiture Act and protected the defendants' sixth amendment
right to counsel.
B.

Jeopardizing the Adversarial System of Justice
The majority's expansive interpretation of the Act made it necessary for the Court to resolve the constitutional issue. In light of
the Court's longstanding acknowledgment of a defendant's fundamental and absolute right to the assistance of counsel,236 it is curious that the majority decided the sixth amendment dilemma as it
did.237 The Court disposed with the argument that a defendant has
234. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2671 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
235. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
236. Justice Black once noted:
Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money
to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime.... Similarly, there
are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best
lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government
hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to
defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in
criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)); see also Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 69 (1942) (the sixth amendment is one of the "bulwarks against the reach of
arbitrary power" and is a " 'safeguard[] deemed necessary to insure fundamental human
rights of life and liberty' ") (citation omitted).
237. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2672 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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a right to counsel of choice by focusing on case law that narrowly
interpreted the scope of a defendant's sixth amendment rights.238
Consequently, the majority neglected the importance of the "disof choice in protecting the integtinct role of the right to counsel
2 39
process.
judicial
rity of the
If, as the dissent suggested, forfeiture will dissuade defense attorneys from taking RICO or CCE cases, or from establishing a relationship with the accused
"based upon confidential
communications, vigorous advocacy, and independence from conflicts of interest," the Forfeiture Act seems to conflict with the
sixth amendment. 2 ° In fact, the Court's decisions in Caplin and
Monsanto create many opportunities to abuse the Forfeiture Act
and subvert the guarantees of the sixth amendment.
First, the majority's interpretation gives government prosecutors
the power to render a defendant indigent by freezing his assets or
by scaring off criminal defense attorneys with the threat of forfeiture. 241 After the defendant is rendered de facto indigent, the government may appoint a government-trained, government-paid
attorney to represent the very person whom government prosecutors seek to convict. Furthermore, the entire process, from indictment to trial, is conducted in a government-controlled court
presided over by a government-paid judge. Because issuance of a
pretrial restraining order is discretionary, the government can use
the forfeiture provision selectively "to exclude only the 'best' defense attorneys from RICO and CCE cases. ' 24 2 It is highly unlikely that Congress intended to instill such a potent weapon in the
law enforcement branch absent an explicit legislative expression.243
Because this potential abuse threatens fundamental constitutional
values and imperils the adversarial system, the Supreme Court
should have resisted addressing the constitutional question and deferred to Congress. 2 "
Second, the majority's resolution of the constitutional issues
leaves the defense bar in a precarious state. A private criminal at238. See supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text.
239. Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2672 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For an extensive discussion of the fundamental right to counsel of choice and its important role in the United
States's adversarial system of justice, see Winick, supra note 39, at 786-817.
240. Cloud, supra note 10, at 15.
241. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (1988).
242. Cloud, supra note 10, at 42-44. "The Department of Justice undoubtedly has
discretion to select those cases in which to seek forfeiture of third party assets and restraining orders." Id. at 43 n.204.
243. Winick, supra note 39, at 853.
244. For an in-depth discussion of the delegation doctrine, see id at 853-65.
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torney accepting a RICO client has no guarantee of being paid unless the defendant has significant, nonforfeitable assets. A criminal
defense attorney cannot accept a case on a contingent fee basis
without violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.245
Consequently, the Court's decision will preclude many private defense attorneys from representing RICO and CCE clients.2 '
This scenario threatens the adversarial system of justice and the
federal defender program in a manner not contemplated by the majority. 247 If the forfeiture provision conceivably can render every
RICO or CCE defendant indigent, the court must appoint to each
defendant an attorney under the Criminal Justice Act.2 48 RICO
and CCE cases are lengthy and extremely complex, draining both
the human and financial resources of the Justice Department.249
The added burden on public defender programs caused by the systematic substitution of appointed counsel for private counsel in
these complex cases ultimately will fall on the truly indigent, who
will have to compete for the Justice Department's limited resources. 25 0 Thus, the Supreme Court has planted the seeds of
many other sixth amendment problems by rejecting a statutory
construction of the Forfeiture Act that exempts attorneys' fees.
V.

IMPACT

The recent interpretation of the Forfeiture Act is most clearly
illustrated by post-Caplin and -Monsanto decisions. Courts that
have applied the Forfeiture Act's provisions, in light of the
Supreme Court's holdings, almost unanimously have deprived the
defendant of his assets, even when those assets were needed to pay
245.

"A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contin-

gent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case."
SIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.5(D)(2) (1983); MODEL

MODEL RULES OF PROFESCODE OF PROFESSIONAL

DR 2-106(C) (1980) (identical language). But see In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Dated Jan. 2, 1985, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("the canons of professional responsibility... require [the attorney] to represent [his client] zealously despite
the risk that he will not receive compensation for his work").
246. Cloud, supra note 10, at 35.
247. Id. at 47 n.224 (quoting United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D.
Colo. 1985) ("'the costs of mounting a defense of an indictment under RICO are far
beyond the resources or expertise of the average federal public defender's office which is
already over taxed' ").
248. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1988).
249. Cloud, supra note 10, at 47.
250. Winick, supra note 39, at 783. In essence, if the public defenders are consumed
with preparing a defense in a complicated RICO or CCE case, defendants whose financial
status leaves them with absolutely no option but to seek the services of the public defender's office might find that there is a lack of legal manpower for their needs.
RESPONSIBILITY
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attorneys' fees.2 51
Ironically, the recent events surrounding deposed Panamanian
dictator Manuel Noriega 25 2 provide a perfect case study for the application of the Court's decision. From the time that the indictments were returned against Noriega some two years ago, many
legal commentators have speculated that federal prosecutors are on
shaky ground.25 3 Besides lacking concrete evidence of Noriega's
role in drug distribution from South America to the United States,
the prosecutors fear that Noriega's attorneys will adopt the "Ollie
North defense." 254
Not surprisingly, the government has seized every opportunity
to debilitate Noriega's defense. With the Supreme Court's Caplin
and Monsanto decisions firmly behind it, the government froze
Noriega's bank accounts shortly after he was captured. 255 Despite
the entreaties of Noriega's attorneys, the government has refused
to release those assets even to pay for Noriega's defense.2 56 In a
dramatic gesture, Noriega's attorneys recently asked the court to
be excused from representing him, arguing that they have been financially disabled as a result of the freeze order.257
The United States government attempted to reach an agreement
with defense counsel to avoid a walk-out. 258 Under the arrange-

ment, the government would have paid the fees of Noriega's defense team. 259 In a display of the government's new found leverage
251. "Any doubt as to the constitutionality of freezing assets and precluding entirely
their use for payment of attorney fees... [has] now been resolved by the Supreme Court's
recent decision[s] in United States v. Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States]." FTC v. World Wide Factors, Ltd., 882 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1989)
(citations omitted); see also United States v. Unit No. 7 and Unit No. 8 of the Shop in
Grove Condominium, 890 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1989) (forfeiture or pretrial restraint of property that would have been used to pay attorneys' fees does not violate fifth or sixth
amendment).
252. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
253. Noriega's Surrender, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 15, 1990, at 15.
254. Id. The "Ollie North defense" refers to a defendant's sometimes successful effort to play off sensitive material in his possession. Id. In this case, the government is
speculating that Noriega possesses a wealth of information that could embarrass United
States officials and jeopardize national security because of Noriega's former ties with the
United States Central Intelligence Agency. Id As a result, federal prosecutors and the
Bush Administration realized early on that they were "bracing for a long and difficult
struggle to convict the accused drug trafficker." Id. at 14.
255. Kaplan, The Best Defense Isn't Free, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1990, at 73.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Although the Criminal Justice Act limits legal fees to $75 per hour, the government was willing to pay Noriega's attorneys $350 per hour, the fee those attorneys usually command. Id
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in the context of attorneys' fees, the government conditioned the
arrangement upon obtaining promises from Noriega's lawyers to
withdraw its demand that the United States Central Intelligence
Agency produce documents regarding years of secret payments to
Noriega. 260 The deal fell apart, however, after a hearing before
United States District Judge William Hoeveler. 26 1 The judge

stated, "[t]here is no way that we can approve anything in excess of
$75 [per hour]. 262 Presumably, then, Noriega's attorneys are
"back to square one" in their fight to obtain standard fees out of
their client's assets.263
VI.

CONCLUSION

As a result of its decisions in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States and United States v. Monsanto, the Supreme Court
continues to chip away at the constitutional safeguards of defendants. The decisions are arguably a victory for those who support a
hard-line approach to the drug war. However, most supporters of
the Forfeiture Act, which strips an accused drug dealer of his assets, fail to recognize the fundamental constitutional issues at
stake. At a minimum, the Court's decisions foreshadow the future
sacrifice of individual rights in face of society's ever-mounting war
against crime. If this trend continues unchecked, the Court's decisions may be looked back upon as the first of many assaults on our
nation's adversarial system of justice.
KATHLEEN A. RAvoTTI

260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. Noriega's attorneys have indicated that they might "challenge the constitutionality of the $75 cap on the ground that it violates their client's right to counsel," due
to the complex circumstances of the case. Id.

